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Abstract: Eternalism is the view that all times are equally real. The relativity of 
simultaneity in special relativity backs this up. There is no cosmically extended, self-
existing ‘now.’ This leads to a tricky problem. What makes statements about the present 
true? I shall approach the problem along the lines of perspectival realism and argue that 
the choice of the perspective does. To corroborate this point, the Lorentz transformations 
of special relativity are compared to the structurally similar equations of the Doppler effect. 
The ‘now’ is perspectivally real in the same way as a particular electromagnetic spectrum 
frequency. I also argue that the ontology of time licensed by perspectival realism is more 
credible in this context than its current alternative, the fragmentalist interpretation of 
special relativity. 
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1. Introduction 
Relativistic physics indicates that the temporal order of two spacelike separated events is relative. 
Hence there is no absolute present moment. This is evident by contrasting Minkowski spacetime 
with a classical spacetime. In the supposedly absolute classical spacetime, with an objective unique 
foliation into simultaneity slices, all and only other events that lie on the same simultaneity slice 
as the token count as happening ‘now.’ In relativity, there is no such objective unique foliation. 
The past, the present, and the future are perspectival in nature. This is good news for eternalism: 
all temporal locations are equally real. 
As relativity debunks absolute and universal present, it is typically interpreted to favor 
eternalism over presentism. The most recent challenge of this idea comes from Carlo Rovelli 
(2019). He agrees that modern physics destroys presentism.1 The structure of relativistic spacetime 
does not permit us to delineate any privileged extended present. Yet Rovelli does not support 
eternalism, either. He criticizes Hilary Putnam’s (1967, Figure 1 on p. 241) classical argument 
which employs ‘now’-slices. Thus Rovelli (2019, p. 1328) puts it as follows: 
Putnam misinterprets Einstein’s simultaneity and mixes relativistic and non relativistic 
concepts, making up a mess. In particular, Einstein’s simultaneity is not a discovery of a 
fact of the matter about multiple simultaneity surfaces: it is the discovery that simultaneity 
has no ontological meaning beyond convention. This destroy Presentism, but does not force 
us into Putnam’s Eternalism. 
 
1 In his Order of Time, Rovelli (2018, p. 44) makes a similar point: “The idea that a well-defined 
now exists throughout the universe is an illusion, an illegitimate extrapolation of our own 
experience.” 
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Rovelli also maintains, which is an integral part of his objection, that eternalism may not 
incorporate passage of time. Here I shall not focus on time’s passing, as it is a huge topic of its 
own. This paper relies on a version of eternalism which is not dependent on hypersurfaces of ‘now’ 
that putatively span across the whole universe. Think the relativity of simultaneity. Provided that 
the one-way speed of light is invariant,2 an observer in one frame can conclude that two spatially 
separated events are simultaneous. Simultaneity within a specific frame is different from mere 
apparent simultaneity. The observer may calculate that the events which produce their observations 
are simultaneous (again, based on light’s determinate finite speed).3 In another frame, moving to 
opposite direction or situated in a different gravitational potential, the very same events are not 
simultaneous, but successive. The two observers in this scenario have different answers as to what 
happens ‘now.’ Both are right in their own frames of reference. This already renders A-locations 
relative: Whether something occurs in the past, in the present, or in the future, is dependent on the 
perspective. Everybody is right in their own frame of reference. We all have our own moments of 
‘now.’ This is enough for eternalism. 
 
2 This standard assumption is of course challenged by the conventionality argument. If we use light 
signals to synchronize two spatially separated clocks, we may only conclude that their roundtrip 
time is invariant. Light’s isotropic speed is not directly measurable. Consequently, spatially distant 
events are not factually but only conventionally simultaneous. This idea was originally formulated 
by Einstein and Poincaré, subsequently developed by Reichenbach and Grünbaum, and then 
criticized by Malament. Thyssen (2019) details these stances and how they are related. 
3 For the distinction between real and apparent simultaneity within an inertial frame, see Slavov 
(2019, p. 348). 
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Despite being hospitable to modern physics, eternalism is problematic for truthmaking. 
What makes statements about temporal positions, like the present moment, true? D. M. Armstrong 
(2004, Chapter 11) defends eternalism because in his view it does not face the typical objections 
of presentism, like postulating truthmakers for past and future in the present, finding truthmakers 
outside of time, or accepting non-existences as truthmakers. Armstrong criticizes one option in the 
debate, but he does not provide a positive answer to the problem. Considering the ramifications of 
relativistic physics, it is difficult to tell what the truthmakers for the ‘now’ could be. Statements 
about what happen ‘now’ are not true in the paradigmatic sense of truth: correspondence between 
a sentence and the world. Compare this to a common sensical realism. The table in front of me 
exists whether I observe, think, or wish it to be there. The substantial existence of the table makes 
the sentence ‘the table exists’ true. What renders statements referring to the ‘now’ true? 
I shall approach this problem along the lines of perspectival realism. This doctrine has 
recently been established by Michela Massimi (2019) and her research group in the philosophy of 
science. The novelty of this paper is to apply the idea of perspectival realism in the philosophy of 
time. This means that although physical events are taken to be primitive, mind-independent 
existences, temporal locations like the ‘now’ are dependent on a perspective. There is no 
truthmaker out there to be discovered that truthmakes claims concerning the present moment. 
Instead, choosing the perspective makes statements referring to the present true. 
To that end, the rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section advances an 
argument in which perspectives play a fundamental role in the existence of the present time. To 
corroborate the argument, the ‘nows’ of the observers shall be assimilated with electromagnetic 
wave lengths, as the Lorentz equations in relativity are analogous to those of the Doppler effect. 
The subsequent section explains why perspectival realism provides a more plausible ontology of 
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time than its relevant alternative, the fragmentalist interpretation of special relativity. The closing 
section ends by claiming that one can convincingly incorporate perspectival realism about the 
present moment in eternalist metaphysics. 
 
2. Choosing the perspective 
It is well-known that for the presentist, finding truthmakers about the past or future is problematic. 
If the past is no longer existent, and the future does not yet exist, there is nothing that makes 
statements concerning them true. In the view of no-futurism, truth-claims concerning the future 
are troublesome as there is a fixed past and open future. The eternalist does not face a similar kind 
of problem, because all temporal positions exist evenly. 
 Despite such initial optimism—or the provisional assumption that the eternalist is better 
off with truthmaking than the presentist4—finding truthmakers for eternalism is all but simple. At 
first sight, we might think that events could serve as truthmakers. They are the fundamental entities 
of relativity. Their existence, unlike their temporal order, is in every case substantial. But events 
themselves are not moments. Without choosing some perspective, an event is not associated with 
any temporal position. The existence of events is not a perspectival matter, but their spacelike 
temporal order is. To show that events exist independently, but not moments, consider the 
spacetime diagrams below. Imaged are three events, A, B, and C.5 The white rounds denote the 
 
4 Baron (2012), Cameron (2011) and Tallant (2009), among others, have explored truthmaking in 
the presentist context. 
5 I have drawn these images by adopting the figure in Bardon (2013, p. 91), rendered in digital 
form by Marcia Underwood. The original file is the courtesy of Wikipedia user Acdx, based on 
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‘now’ of an event, or events, while the black rounds indicate future events in spacetime from an 
observer’s point of view: 
 
 
Figure 1. For an observer with zero velocity, the three events are simultaneous. They happen 
‘now.’ 
 
 
file: Relativity_of_Simultaneity.svg. Source (consulted on January 17, 2019): 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Relativity_of_Simultaneity_ Animation.gif. The original file 
includes an animated ‘now’-slice, and it shows the skewing of spacetime according to different 
observers. I provide these figures to highlight the independence of events, and their separation of 
moments. It should be made clear that there are various ways of conceiving spacetime. Gilmore, 
Costa and Calosi (2016) elucidate three different positions on the four-dimensional views of the 
universe implied by relativity theory: 1) spacetime unitism, 2) the B-theory, and 3) perdurantism. 
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Figure 2. For an observer moving with 𝑣, A happens ‘now.’ 
 
 
Figure 3. For an observer moving with −𝑣, C happens ‘now.’ 
 
All observers disagree on what happens ‘now,’ but no one disagrees whether the events happen or 
not (Dolev 2006, p. 179). In accordance with special relativity, events exist in their own right. One 
way to explain this is to note that observers do not generally observe the events at the exact same 
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time in which they happen in a specific frame. This is due to time-lag: The information of 
something happening is transferred by light (or some other electromagnetic spectrum frequency or 
a signal slower than it) from the event to the observer. The event happens before and independently 
of it being observed. 
So, events themselves are not relative—they just happen—but the temporal order of 
spacelike separated events is. Accordingly, events, however important for relativity’s ontology, 
are not the truthmakers of claims about ‘now.’ This is a truly stunning implication for our 
metaphysics. It is like the ‘now’ vanishes; as if it is not affiliated with anything real. Yet I think 
there is a way to argue for a type of realist ontology of the ‘now.’ Below I present a mathematical 
analogy that explains how specifying a particular frame makes statements concerning the present 
true. 
If for 𝑂′ two events are simultaneous, ∆𝑡′ = 0. From Lorentz transformations we get that 
for 𝑂, who moves with a velocity 𝑣, the time difference between the events is ∆𝑡 =
𝑣∆𝑥′/𝑐2√1 − 𝛽2, in which 𝛽 = 𝑣/𝑐 and ∆𝑥′ ≠ 0. The two distant events are successive for 𝑂. 
For a third observer 𝑂′′ moving to opposite direction with a velocity −𝑣, the events would be 
successive, and could be in the opposite order than for 𝑂. Whether two events are simultaneous or 
not depends on the selection of the inertial frame of reference. Consequently, the three observers 
all have different ‘now’ moments. 
Now to the central allegory of this paper. The relativity of temporal positions is analogous 
to the relativity of electromagnetic waving. Here is an example of the Doppler effect. If a stationary 
source emits waves with a wavelength of 𝜆0, then the waves for an approaching source are shorter 
and higher in frequency, 𝜆+ =  √1 − 𝛽/1 + 𝛽𝜆0, and for a receding source they are longer and 
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lower in frequency, 𝜆− =  √1 + 𝛽/1 − 𝛽𝜆0. All the values for the same electromagnetic wave, 
𝜆0, 𝜆+, and 𝜆− are different. 
My argument does not assume that waving and temporal positions are perfectly equivalent. 
Color perception, for example, differs in many ways from temporal experience. But the two 
following questions—What determines the electromagnetic frequency? What determines the 
temporal order of events? —have the same answer: the selected frame of reference. We can speak 
of a definite frequency or a definite order only after designating the observer. In both cases, the 
relevant quantities are relative to motion (and by general relativistic extension, both quantities are 
relative to gravitational effects). 
Both electromagnetic waving and physical events exist by themselves.6 But without 
specifying a frame, there is no sense asking what is the one true spectrum frequency, any more 
than there is sense asking what really happens right now. In this respect, redshifting/blueshifting 
in cosmology is analogous with the relativity of event ordering in special relativity. Depending on 
the co-ordinate system, one observer might observe the same electromagnetic waving as a color 
red, the other as a color green, and the third as a color blue. Likewise, depending on the co-ordinate 
system, observers might observe the same events in different order, for example, one sees the 
 
6 Electromagnetic waves are made of real entities, electric and magnetic fields. They are not mere 
theoretical instruments: they restore energy and carry information. Likewise, physical events just 
happen absolutely before anyone sees them [because an event happening and an observer 
registering it are timelike (or lightlike) separated: the information from the earlier event (in this 
case, the event itself) reaches the later event (observer’s perception) with the electromagnetic wave 
speed or slower than it], and so must exist independently of the observer. 
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opening of a living room door first and opening of the kitchen window after, the second both 
openings at the same time, and the third the opening of the window before the door. Waves and 
events themselves do not dictate frequencies or temporal positions; the choice of the frame does. 
In the same way as my perception of some color is real to me, also the happening of an event ‘now’ 
is real to me. Such reality must be perspectival in nature. 
It might be argued that the analogy between the relativity of temporal positions and 
electromagnetic frequencies is not completely straightforward. In some sense there is a preferred 
reference frame for electromagnetic frequency: the inertial frame in which the emitter is 
momentarily at rest. This proper frequency could be equated with the true frequency. Events are 
not associated with any preferred inertial frames because they, treated as point-like, have zero 
duration. This is different from electromagnetic signals as their emission occurs during a nonzero 
interval. A part of the observer’s lightlike wordline is bound by the emitter. This is consistent with 
infinitesimal inertial reference frames in general relativity, too. 
 This counterargument lacks substance. First, concerning the debates within the ontology 
of time, it is controversial to treat events merely as point-like. Hanoch Ben-Yami (2019) has 
convincingly argued that real applicable events have durations. Durationless mathematical points 
are not physical events. They are idealizations which take “a process of precisification to its 
mathematical, theoretical limit” (Ben-Yami 2019, p. 1358). The duration of an actual event is also 
rather vague. The beginning and the end of an event cannot be defined with a high degree of 
accuracy. Neither of the event’s temporal boundaries is clear-cut. Second, it is true that, originally 
in the emitter’s inertial frame, one can define a proper frequency. Certain radio antenna, for 
example, has charges that oscillate 100 million times per second so to produce a frequency of 
100MHz. Definite electric currents are needed at the source, but not afterwards. Once the wave 
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has been created and it has left its original source, the received frequency becomes a matter of 
perspective. The result is that there is no one true frequency but a multiplicity of true frequencies. 
This reinforces, rather than questions, the perspectival nature of frequency. 
An important characteristic in the notion of perspectival reality is that there is truth within 
a perspective. Ronald Giere (2006, p. 81) elucidates this position in an indexical fashion. In his 
example, an observer standing on the steps of the Capitol Building sees the White House on the 
right side of the Washington Monument. This statement is true within the chosen perspective. It 
would be false to say that, for example, the White House is on the left of the Washington 
Monument. Once the perspective is explicated, there is little point to argue about the veracity of a 
conclusion like this. Giere (2006, p. 81–2) notes that 
Of course, we do not typically think of our everyday ways of speaking as being within a 
perspective. But neither do most people think of colors as being relative to the perspective 
of the human chromatic visual system. 
There are truths about spatial locations as well as color perceptions within a perspective. 
Correspondingly, there are truths about statements concerning the ‘now’ within a perspective. In 
our everyday lives, we do not think that tensed claims are made from a perspective. But this is no 
different than our everyday claims that tacitly assume objective and absolute character of colors. 
We tend to say that grass is green, assuming that greenness is the property of the object. Still color 
perception is relative to state of motion and sensory and nervous systems.  As long as we specify 
the circumstances under which particular statements are true, there is no reason to be skeptical or 
cynical about them. ‘Grass is green’ is no doubt true, but it is true only within a perspective. 
Recently, in his defense of the B-theory, Emiliano Boccardi (2018) has claimed that A-
determinations, like presentness, are irreal. The main argument in his paper is that B-theoretical 
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approach can explain our dynamic experience of time better than the A-theory. In the course of 
articulating his stance, Boccardi (2018, p. 395) writes: 
A-determinations of pastness, presentness and futurity are taken to be unreal and illusory. 
According to the B-theory, objective A-determinations are totally absent from reality, even 
from that part of reality which consists of experiential events. 
Boccardi’s metaphysical position is that A-properties are not fundamental or ultimate features of 
the world. The eternalist and relativistic framework assumed in this paper agrees that reality is not 
inherently tensed. But why is this different than saying that reality is not inherently colored? Non-
fundamental A-properties may be included in the list of what exists in the same way as non-
fundamental colors.7 Here we may draw on the notion of relative fundamentality, as articulated for 
example by Tuomas Tahko (2018). Less fundamental entities depend on the existence of more 
fundamental entities in terms of priority ordering. This implies that the more fundamental may 
exist independently of the less fundamental, but not the other way around. Yet relative 
fundamentality does not imply that the less fundamental is somehow less real or non-existent. 
In no way does relativity imply that temporal ordering is fictitious. Rather, what is 
imaginary is that there would be an absolute-universal time, which functions as an objective metric 
for placing events into past, present or future. Contradicting truth-claims about the present moment 
can be resolved once a frame is specified,8 and the notion of a perspectival reality adopted. 
 
7 Slavov (2019) has argued that A-properties, although less fundamental than B-properties, may 
be incorporated in non-reductive physicalism. 
8 Pinillos (2011) clarifies the contextual nature of truth regarding time dilation. In his example, 
there is a passenger on a train and an observer at a platform. The observer stays at the platform 
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3. Tackling the fragmentalist interpretation of special relativity 
Perspectival realism licenses a different kind of ontology compared to its relevant alternative, the 
fragmentalist interpretation of special relativity. According to Martin A. Lipman’s (2020, p. 23) 
general definition, which draws on the work of Kit Fine (2005), “fragmentalism is the view that 
the world is inherently perspectival.” Fragmentalism does not maintain only that we have different 
perspectives and ways of representing the world. Reality itself is thought to be essentially 
perspectival, constituted by fragmented facts. Some aspects of the fragmentalist position are not 
in tension with the version of perspectival realism as defended in this paper. A-properties are 
inherently perspectival and real. Different temporal locations are not “mere appearances of an 
underlying layer of compatible facts,” to paraphrase Lipman (2020, p. 24). What varies across 
perspectives like reference frames is not mere appearance.9 This much is consistent with 
 
and the train makes a roundtrip. Eventually the two compare their clocks and conclude that they 
do not agree. They have measured different lapses of time between two events, that is, between 
the departure and the arrival of the train. When asking whether the passenger or the observer is 
right, Pinillos (2011, p. 65) notes that there are three possible answers: “(A) Exactly one of them 
asserted something true, (B) Neither one of them asserted anything true, and (C) Both asserted 
something true.” The last option is true without any contradiction. 
9 In his characterization of the metaphysical consequences of special relativity, Lipman (2020, p. 
22) takes the following to be the standard view: “The Minkowskian conception of spacetime 
accepts the assumption that what varies across perspectives (such as frames of references) must be 
mere appearance.” This is a controversial characterization. Agreeing with standard relativistic 
physics, Shimony (1993, Chapter 18), by leaning on the contributions of Carnap, Grünbaum and 
14 
 
fragmentalism. It is however unclear whether fragmentalism separates events and their temporal 
locations. According to perspectival realism, events, on the side of the world, form the material 
basis for our tensed claims. Unlike frames of reference, they are fundamental.10 Events occur as 
they do, independently of observers. Their existence is not perspectival. In my rendition, 
fragmentalism does not take events to be primitive. Instead, in the context of special relativity, 
fragmental frame-times are fundamental. Consider the following general characterization by 
Lipman (2020, p. 23): 
We standardly assume that we only ever have perspectival representations of a non-
perspectival world. Fragmentalism denies this assumption, allowing that the world is itself 
an inherently perspectival place where facts do not simply obtain or fail to obtain, as we 
ordinarily assume, but where certain facts can obtain in the context of one set of facts and 
yet fail to obtain in the context of other sets of facts. 
 
Weyl, has argued in detail that frame-dependent A-properties are subjective but still in no way 
“mere appearances.” 
10 In its inception, special relativity relied heavily on inertial frames (a good collection of early 
papers is Lorentz et al. 1923). Even later expositions, like those of Prokhovnik (1967) and Bell 
(1976), were sympathetic to the view that there is a frame really at rest, defined by the aether. 
These are certainly interesting historical considerations. Yet more recently Maudlin (2012, p. 67) 
has criticized the primacy of inertial frames by arguing that they are not fundamental, but 
derivative. The notion of an inertial frame refers to motion. No particle of mass or body has 
absolute speed. Moreover, there are no inertial frames in general relativity. 
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In the quote above, fragmentalism is associated with denying the assumption that we “have 
perspectival representations of a non-perspectival world.” This is the major difference between 
fragmentalism and perspectival realism. The latter treats A-locations as “perspectival 
representations” of “non-perspectival world” of physical events. To continue with the next 
sentence of the quote, Lipman refers to the concept of a fact. He does not elaborate on this notion. 
Provided that events are treated factually, there should be an unambiguous fact to the matter of 
whether an event obtains. As Dennis Dieks (2006, p. 170) has noted, the four-dimensional 
relativistic diagram records all events spread across spacetime.11 In no case may events fail to 
obtain. If an event does not obtain, it does not exist. It is not then a part and parcel of spacetime. 
A non-existent thing is not an event, and never will be. Events have to be fundamental. They are 
not perspectival or separated into different fragments. The claim that events exist independently 
of them being observed is perfectly common sensical and consistent with relativity. Due to time-
lag, physical events take place before we receive information of them.12 If we do not affect the 
events in question, they must exist substantially. 
 In themselves events are however entirely mute on whether a moment is past, present, or 
future. In other words, events are necessary for temporal placement (A-properties of past, present, 
and future) and temporal ordering (B-properties of before and after), but they do not necessitate 
 
11 Whether events should be treated statically or dynamically (so to include passage into one’s 
ontology) is a debate of its own. Eddington (1920, p. 46) famously provided a static analysis: 
“Events do not happen; they are just there, and we come across them.” Dieks (2006) objects this 
and argues for a dynamic nature of events that is consistent with the block universe view. 
12 On the compatibility of time-lag and eternalism, see Power (2013). 
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the truths about any moment. Truthmaking is done only by choosing the perspective. This can be 
either an inertial frame as in the special theory or a non-inertial like in the general theory. It is a 
conventional matter of how many co-ordinate systems one wishes to establish. There is no 
privileged frame, but there are as many times as there are frames (Dorato and Wittman 2015, p. 
195). A-properties are not the attributes of physical processes.  The choice of the frame determines 
an event’s temporal, tensed location: ‘nowness’ of an event is an observer-dependent matter. 
The fragmentalist position brings back partly Newtonian ideas by invoking “genuine facts 
regarding absolute simultaneity, duration and length” (Lipman 2020, p. 21). Fine supports this by 
arguing that reality is fragmented into parts that are all affiliated with their own frame-times. Each 
fragment is considered Newtonian in a way that saves an absolute notion of the present. In Fine’s 
(2005, pp. 304) own words: 
The presentist takes there to be an absolute and objective sense in which a given frame-
time is the standpoint of reality. He is therefore in a position to distinguish a particular 
frame as the frame of this standpoint; and this then enables him to characterize an absolute 
notion of simultaneity as simultaneity within this frame. 
Based on the quote above, any given inertial frame can be chosen as an absolute frame having its 
own notion of simultaneity. The terminology at play is not explicit. I assume that in this context 
‘absolute’ does not denote ‘unique’. Fragmentalism does not imply that there is one and only one 
way to foliate spacetime. Rather, different fragments of reality incorporate their own genuine 
tensed realities. “This then,” to reiterate, enables one “to characterize an absolute notion of 
simultaneity as simultaneity within this frame.” 
How tenable this view is depends on the notion of ‘absolute.’ According to a standard 
definition, at least in the philosophy of time context, ‘absolute’ means substantial existence. When 
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Newton described absolute time in the Scholium of the Definitions of his Principia, he very clearly 
meant that time “in and of itself and of its own nature, without reference to anything external, 
flows uniformly.” He separated the substantial, self-existing (that is, absolute) time from 
observable and relative measures of time. Fragmentalism is certainly not committed to the 
substantial Newtonian flow of time. But it still supports a qualified substantivalist claim: fragments 
of reality are by themselves associated with absolute simultaneity. Locating the present moment is 
not about choosing a perspective, about setting up a frame, but identifying a fragment’s own 
absolute time. 
It is hard to see how fragmentalism could completely avoid obsolete Newtonian ideas. If 
fragments of reality have their absolute frame-times, one is committed to local absolute spaces. As 
with time, fragmentalism is not implying that there is one and only one space. Neither does it claim 
that absolute space is immaterial as Newton had it. Yet fragmentalism updates Newton’s 
substantivalist concept of time (and space) with a multiplicity of substantivalist frame-times. This 
is at odds with relativity. Thomas Hofweber and Marc Lange (2017) detail how the fragmentalist 
take on relativity is in tension with the Lorentz transformations. This includes, for example, the 
relations of salient variables like spacetime coordinates in different frames, as well as other 
physical facts such as specific electric fields, pressures and charge densities. 
 Whether fragmentalism could be made consistent with modern science has to do with how 
well it can be integrated to various physical theories. Lipman (2020, p. 22) acknowledges the 
tentative nature of his research program. In his view, “the question of which theory is ultimately 
better will depend crucially on wider theory integration, how well each interpretation generalizes 
and meshes with other scientific theories”. I agree that this is a difficult topic, and not to be settled 
in any easy way. To my understanding, the Newtonian aspects of fragmentalism are in tension 
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with the consensus of institutionalized physics community. The special theory essentially shows 
that time is relative, not absolute. The theory does not exist in isolation, because it is a central part 
of modern physics. The special theory corrected the preceding Maxwellian-Hertzian ether-based 
electrodynamic theories, and it is part of experimental high-energy physics, even the quantum field 
theory. It is also contained in general relativity which accounts for gravitational fields (Baron 2018, 
p. 9). 
Here I am, perhaps in a controversial manner, appealing to the authority of a current 
scientific consensus at the expense of a metaphysical theory. It is certainly debatable how 
naturalized our philosophy of time ought to be.13 Leaving aside important metametaphysical 
debates, I wish to stress the following point. Fragmentalism maintains the absoluteness of the 
present moment in the hybrid Newtonian-relativistic sense. A problem emerges: the relative 
quantity of time fails to be comparable to the relative quantity of electromagnetic spectrum 
frequency. This is highly dubious; the equations of the Doppler effect and special relativity are 
structurally analogous. They both show how specific quantities are transformed from one frame to 
another. If we allow the present moment to be absolute, why not allow colors to be absolute, too? 
Say we are having lunch here on Earth. There is no absolute fact to the matter of whether the Mars 
rover takes a picture at the exact same time as we are eating our meals. Fragmentalism maintains 
that these different fragments, the specific inertial frame-time fragment on Earth, and the specific 
inertial frame-time fragment on Mars, both have their own absolute simultaneities and hence 
present times. If this is true, why would they not have their own absolute colors? If ‘nowenesses’ 
are properties of different fragments, why are colors not properties of different fragments? A-
 
13 For discussion, see Hawley (2006) and Dyke (2013). 
19 
 
determinations and colors do not have a substantial existence. Colors are not absolute attributes of 
any fragments of reality. Neither are present moments. 
Fine and Lipman could acknowledge that their interpretation upends the standardly 
assumed order of relative fundamentality regarding spacetime and inertial frames. They could 
insist that this is not a mark against their fragmentalism because it is still an empirically equivalent 
interpretation to the orthodox theory. They could also maintain that their interpretation does not 
satisfy my Doppler effect analogy, but this metaphor is hardly essential to understanding time in 
relativity theory. Within the relativistic context, this would be however cherry picking: one cannot 
consistently choose what quantities to hold absolute and what relative. Relative simultaneity is 
encoded in the Lorentz transformations. The equations show that different frames may not agree 
on the temporal interval between two events. As with color quantities dictated by the Doppler 
effect, this is usually true on a cosmic scale. Any present moment is inherently relative and 
subjective much the same way any color is inherently relative and subjective. This is not only a 
claim about the mathematical structure of a scientific theory. Lorentz equations tell us in what way 
temporal locations exist. The ontology set forth by perspectival realism fits better with these 
equations, and hence with the contemporary scientific practice. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper was directed at the question of what, in an eternalist relativistic account of the world, 
makes statements concerning the present true. More broadly, it tackled the ontological issue: In 
what sense does the ‘now’ exist? It was argued that the ‘now’ does not exist like ordinary physical 
objects or processes like events. Ascertaining what makes statements concerning the present 
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moment true is different than ascertaining what makes commonplace statements like ‘there are 
stars in the sky’ true. The ‘now’ is not out there to be discovered like astronomical objects. 
As the ‘now’ lacks a truthmaker in mind-independent physical reality, this paper advanced 
the argument that, under the assumption of perspectival reality, the choice of the perspective 
renders claims concerning the present true. The existence of A-properties is relative in the same 
indexical way as the existence of spatial locations and electromagnetic spectrum frequencies. This 
argument is bolstered by the fact that the Lorentz transformations are similar in structure to the 
equations of the Doppler effect. In conclusion, a perspectival realist position about the present 
moment is consistent with eternalist metaphysics and relativistic physics.14  
 
14 This paper benefited from various referee comments. I thank the two reviewers of this journal, 
as well as reviewers for Mind, Ratio, Inquiry, Dialectica and Analysis. Many thanks for the 
feedback that I got after presenting the paper at the Annual Colloquium of the Philosophical 
Society of Finland 2020 in Helsinki. 
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